



“From the Battle of Seattle to Maunakea: Post-Anarchism and the Politics of Friendship”

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“No violence!” “No violence!” “No violence!” The chants from the chorus were ringing in my ears as I watched a line of policemen, some with bayonets affixed, march down the street toward a cordon of protestors who had assembled in front of a large inflatable blue whale that we had earlier beached in the middle of the street. It was the beginning of what became known as the “Battle of Seattle” which broke out in that city on November 30, 1999, as part of the protest against the World Trade Organization. I had come to Seattle a few days earlier with a group of folks in a trip organized by the Mendocino Environmental Center and the Alliance for Democracy. I had moved to the Mendocino mountains earlier that summer, and when I learned of the major protest and civil-disobedience action planned for the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, I knew I had to go. The issue of civil disobedience was one of the most important topics I had covered in many of the philosophy courses I had taught in Honolulu in preceding years. As I watched the phalanx of police marching down toward my new friends gathered in front of the whale, blocking the street, I couldn’t help but think of Dr. King and the march that had failed in Memphis just two weeks before his assassination. His friends report that after that he was more depressed than they had ever seen him. Here he was trying to organize a poor people’s march on Washington, and the march in Memphis in the sanitation workers’s strike had failed as some of the protestors had refused to heed his call to remain non-violent. It was the first time he had led a march that led to violence and the national press pilloried King and the movement in the days that followed, calling into question the planned march on Washington.

I was thinking about all this and hoping with bated breath that everyone was going to be able to remain non-violent. I had been very impressed with the non-violence training sessions

that had been held in the days prior and which had been strongly recommended for all those who intended to participate in the civil disobedience planned for that day. I was therefore hopeful, even if apprehensive. There was a perfectly legal massive protest march planned for later that afternoon; but the civil disobedience action involved breaking the law in blocking the streets and the entrances to the convention site and the hotels where the WTO officials were



*The author ("Free") in green rain coat and red cap at the Hilton*

staying. I had an interesting vantage point to see what unfolded. I wasn't sure at what level I was going to be involved, but I ended up sitting down with four others, locked arm in arm, blocking the entrance to the Hilton there at 6<sup>th</sup> and University.

We had placed the whale across 6<sup>th</sup> street a little way down from the intersection, and from that vantage point sitting down in front of the entrance to the hotel, I watched the police march downhill from above the intersection, crossing right in front of me, toward the folks gathered in front of the whale. I saw the bayonets. Bayonets? What the hell? The crowd, now numbering perhaps a couple hundred gathered around that intersection, were chanting all the while: "The whole world is watching!" "This is what democracy looks like!" "No violence!" "No violence!" When the police reached the line of protestors, the protestors did just as they had been trained, locked arms and sat down in front of the whale. Then the police pushed some of them aside and bayoneted the whale. It only sagged a bit, as the man who had brought the whale, had brought a pump with a battery which he wheeled behind us as we carried the whale to the site. The police retreated, seemingly a bit surprised, and the crowd erupted in cheers and more chants. An almost celebratory atmosphere ensued for perhaps another hour. Some folks came up



*Carrying the whale to 6th and University*

to me with a video camera and asked me to explain what we were doing. I tried to explain how this civil disobedience action was intended to draw attention to problems with the WTO, how this trade organization was just going to make the government more subservient to corporations, and the goal of maximizing wealth at the expense of labor interests and environmental concerns. At some point the interview was interrupted as a few people

started shouting “gas!” “gas!” and I looked to my right and the police were now back, but this time in full SWAT gear.

The police captain got on the bullhorn and announced that everyone had five minutes to clear the street. Did they march down and arrest those sitting peacefully in non-violent civil disobedience? It would have been inconvenient, I suppose, if newspaper headlines the next day reported on the mass arrests of peaceful demonstrators against the WTO. No, the police opened fire with rubber bullets and tear gas. There were screams and shouting and the crowd again chanting: “No violence!” “No violence!” “The whole world is watching!” I saw a woman with blood streaking down her face. I think it was something of a miracle that no one was killed. Some would crawl out of the street overcome by the gas; but the gas would rise, and others would crawl in taking their place. I saw the police now standing with their machine guns pointed down at the heads of those hunkered down with their faces as close to the ground as possible to avoid the gas. But the police had hand-held tear gas dispensers, and they sprayed down upon them, sometimes directly in the face of those who dared to lift their heads. The five of us sitting in the doorway of the hotel remained arm in arm and tried, just as we had been instructed in the training sessions, to remain as calm as possible despite the screaming, shouting, and loud cracks of police weapons. I don’t know how long passed, maybe an hour, and the police had still not managed to clear the street or the blocked doorways. Everyone held their position. At one point I could feel a policeman’s boots up against my back and I thought the arrest was finally imminent. The woman who had organized our trip was standing behind me trying to explain to the police that this was non-violent civil disobedience. The tension kept building and building, and then suddenly the police just disappeared. They took off quickly, and only later did we learn it was because there were a few self-described anarchists in black hoods and masks who took to breaking windows and setting dumpsters afire elsewhere and the police were no longer concerned with us and the whale.



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*The Nation* magazine would later go on to rank the “Battle of Seattle” as one of the hundred most important political events of the twentieth century; and it has also been hailed as inaugurating a revival of anarchism, a new or third-wave of anarchism which has sometimes been referred to as “post-anarchism.” The post-anarchist theorists contend that this resurgence of anarchism has challenged the dominant position of Marxism on the left political spectrum. An

anthology on post-anarchism begins with the bold assertion that “[a]narchism is widely accepted as ‘the’ movement behind the main organizational principles of the radical social movements in the twenty-first century” (Evren 2011, 1). These diverse movements of resistance involve anti-capitalist, anti-war, and environmental activists, as well as those resisting racial oppression as in the Black Lives Matter movement, the oppression of women in the Feminist movement, the oppression of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people in the LGBT movement, and oppression of indigenous peoples as in the movement at Standing Rock, and perhaps even perhaps the Ku Kia‘i Mauna movement here in Hawai‘i. What loosely ties all these movements together, according to post-anarchist theorists such as Saul Newman, are “new and experimental forms of political practice and organization that are anarchistic in orientation” (Newman 2010, 167).

The term “post-anarchism” is not meant to suggest a departure from anarchism. The primary goals and commitments of classical anarchists are not abandoned, but rather given an updated theoretical justification in post-structuralist philosophy. As Newman explains: “The prefix ‘post-’ does not mean ‘after’ or ‘beyond’, but rather a working at the conceptual limits of anarchism with the aim of revising, renewing, and even radicalizing its implications” (Newman 2011, 63). The classical anarchists had inherited the conceptual underpinnings of Enlightenment philosophy, beginning with the faith in reason, that reason can reveal the truth of the nature of things, especially the truth of human nature. Post-anarchism takes in to account the critique of these Enlightenment assumptions concerning knowledge and human nature put forth by Nietzsche and subsequently developed in post-structuralist thinkers such as Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, and Derrida.

Although anarchism is still popularly associated with a descent into chaos and violence, as a political philosophy it was never about bringing about disorder and chaos, but rather the liberation of humanity from the oppressive order imposed by religion, capitalism, and state power. What the anarchist philosophers were advocating was a new kind of order, different from the authoritarian order that enforced such great inequities in society. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the first modern political philosopher to declare himself an anarchist, proposed a *spontaneous order*, emerging without central authority, where everyone does “what he wishes and only what he wishes” (Proudhon 1927, 45). Proudhon also described this as an anarchic order: “as man seeks justice in equality, so society seeks order in anarchy” (Proudhon 1994, 209). As the American anarchist Emma Goldman later put it: “Anarchism stands for a social order based on the free grouping of individuals for the purpose of producing real social wealth, an order that will guarantee to every human being free access to the earth and full enjoyment of the necessities of life, according to individual desires, tastes, and inclinations” (Goldman 1969, 62). The anarchist writers were utopian thinkers believing that human beings could live in harmony with one

another and with the natural world if it were not for the exploitation of human beings and the natural world driven by capitalism. The renowned geographer and anarchist writer Élisée Reclus had presciently warned in 1864 that violent exploitation of the earth would render it uninhabitable; and he praised the “truly civilized man” who “understands that his interest is bound up with the interests of everyone and with that of nature” (Antliff 2007, 43).

The main goal of anarchism as a political philosophy was the maximization of both liberty and equality. The emphasis on equality led to a critique of capitalism shared with the socialists; but the importance of liberty led to a critique of the hegemony of state-enforced socialism. As Mikhail Bakunin expressed it: “we are convinced that freedom without socialism is privilege and injustice, and that socialism without freedom is slavery and brutality” (Bakunin 1953, 269). The goal of maximizing liberty and equality led to the anarchist distinctive opposition to government. For Bakunin, equality of political rights and equal liberty were incompatible with the state. Newman sums this up: “The demand for emancipation, central to radical politics, has always been based on the inseparability of liberty and equality. Anarchists were unique in the contention that this cannot be achieved—indeed cannot even be conceptualized—within the framework of the state” (Newman 2011, 48). The anarchists thus focused on this goal of emancipation from all forms of state power.

Of course, all modern justifications for the state as social contract were based on a theory of human nature, and the anarchist attacks on the state were also based on a rational representation of human nature. In sharp contrast with Hobbes’s pessimistic conception of human beings as selfish and brutish, necessitating the absolute power of a Leviathan, the anarchists held a very optimistic view of human beings as capable of compassion and thus living in social harmony. The state, as a coercive institution, was at odds with this view of human nature. In the first modern work of political philosophy to expound on anarchism, William Godwin puts forth the view that human beings were perfectible, capable of continuing improvement due to the innate ability to reason (Godwin 1971, 231). Once individuals develop this capacity to reason, the acceptance of rule by others would come into question. Peter Kropotkin argued contrary to Darwin that it was the inherent capacity for cooperation, not competition, that enabled human survival. It was the development of the centralized nation state and capitalist economics that inhibited this capacity for cooperation (Kropotkin 1987, 203). Proudhon also put forth an ontological justification for anarchism, arguing that private property was not natural to human beings, and that the great inequities in property only exist due to the coercion of the state (Proudhon 1994, 37). Despite some differences in their accounts of human nature, these anarchist writers share a common view of human nature. Andrew Koch sums up these ontological justifications for anarchism: “The human being is seen as a rational, cognitive and compassionate creature. Corruption takes place within social institutions and is not an

essential part of human nature. As reason takes mankind toward the truth, rational individuals lose their need for the state” (Koch 2011, 26).

Post-structuralist philosophy develops Nietzsche’s critique of Enlightenment philosophy, both its epistemological foundations and essentialist conceptions of human nature. Nietzsche’s characterizations of the “philosophers of the future” as artists and lucid dreamers challenges the traditional conception of philosophy. For Plato, artists are consigned to the dreamworld of appearances, playing only with fictions, while the philosopher has the serious task of waking from the dreamworld and discovering the underlying truth of reality stripped of all appearances. Nietzsche calls into question the very notion of a “naked truth,” emphasizing that philosophers “should cherish the *modesty* with which nature has concealed herself behind enigmas and iridescent uncertainties” (Nietzsche 2018, 13). For Nietzsche, there are no naked truths, or “knowledge in itself” as knowing is not a matter of passive contemplation or correct representation; there are only perspective truths, as we only see from perspective points of view, and all knowing involves “the active powers of interpretation which first makes seeing into seeing something” (Nietzsche 1996, 98). The philosopher is thus necessarily an artist, as Nietzsche suggests in using an analogy drawn from painting to describe philosophy: “Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of apparentness and, as it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance different ‘values,’ to use the language of painters? Why couldn’t the world *that concerns us*—be a fiction?” (Nietzsche 1966, 46–47).

We couldn’t live without these fictions, however, and the philosophers of the future Nietzsche looks forward to will be the ones who are like lucid dreamers in becoming aware of this artistic, active power of interpretation in all knowing. “I have suddenly awakened in the middle of this dream, but only to the consciousness of dreaming, and that I *must* continue to dream lest I perish, just as the sleepwalker must continue to dream lest he slip and fall” (Nietzsche 2018, 73). There may be narratives, stories we tell ourselves about the point of it all and the nature of nature, but there is no “ultimate and real” story or “metanarrative.” Nietzsche’s suggestion that we should understand that the world that concerns us is a fiction anticipates Lyotard’s famous characterization of the postmodern condition as an “incredulity toward metanarratives” (Lyotard 1979, xxiv–xxv). This is also what Derrida meant by the controversial phrase “There is nothing outside of the text [*il n’y a pas de hors-texte*]” (Derrida 1974, 158), often misunderstood as the claim that there is nothing outside of language. What the phrase really says is that “there is no outside-text” or, in other words, there is no truth without veils, no access to a reality that is not already a product of interpretation.

If it no longer makes sense to speak of a transcendental realm of *things in themselves*, and it is accepted that the world that concerns us is a fiction, then the whole Enlightenment project of establishing universal truths about nature or human beings is called into question. The

essentialist account of human nature inherited by the classical anarchist philosophers can no longer be sustained. As Foucault put it in *The Order of Things*, “man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.” The figure of man that has shaped the humanism of the Enlightenment, he famously concluded, is destined to disappear “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 2002, 422).

The post-anarchist philosophers argue that the Enlightenment assumptions of the classical anarchists can be set aside without abandoning the fundamental anarchist commitment to a politics of emancipation. Newman includes among these classical anarchist assumptions: “an essentialist conception of the subject, the universality of morality and reason, and the idea of the progressive enlightenment of humankind; a conception of the social order as naturally constituted (by natural laws, for instance) and rationally determined; a dialectical view of history, and a certain positivism whereby science could reveal the truth of social relations” (Newman 2010, 6). Newman contends that “anarchism today does not need these deep foundations in human nature and moral and rational enlightenment to advance a radical politics and ethics of equal-liberty” (Newman 2010, 6). Koch draws a similar conclusion: “Post-structuralism challenges the idea that it is possible to create a stable ontological foundation for the creation of universal statements about human nature. In the relationship between theory and practice, these foundational claims have been used to legitimate the exercise of power. Without the ability to fix human identity, the political prescriptions that rely on such claims are open to question. This creates the basis for a different approach to the formulation of anarchist politics, what has come to be termed *post-anarchism*” (Koch 2011, 24).

So post-anarchism would be an anarchism that involves, as Newman explains, “an abandonment of essentialist ideas about human nature, of social positivism, of ideas about an immanent social rationality that drives revolutionary change” (Newman 2011, 62). This different approach takes up Nietzsche’s genealogical task of unmasking the existing structures of culture to reveal its illusions. As Koch puts it, “Nietzsche’s genealogical exploration is concerned with the way in which the facts of the contemporary world have been created” (Koch 2011, 29). If all representations are only fictions, then politics cannot be organized around truth. The central question then becomes “Who speaks?” If the world that concerns us is a creation of those who speak and give the world its image, then politics becomes a matter of carefully considering the link between language, knowledge, and power. If politics cannot be organized around truth, as Koch explains, “because it lacks transcendental grounding, and politics cannot be organized around justice because its representation reflects the interests of those who define it, then politics is reduced to the expression of power” (Koch 2011, 29).

In some ways post-anarchism would have a more modest agenda than traditional anarchism. As May explains, just as post-structuralism makes “no pretensions of offering a

general political theory,” offering instead “precise analyses of oppression,” post-anarchism takes up a “micropolitics” of “decentralized resistance and with local self-determination” (May 2011, 42-43). Nietzsche’s critique of truth and explorations in genealogical inquiry are thus crucial in the development of this new anarchism. Koch sums up the importance of Nietzsche’s thought: “while Nietzsche rejected the ontological claims that provided the foundation for much of nineteenth-century anarchism, he made a monumental contribution to the development of post-anarchism” (Koch 2011, 29).

Nietzsche, of course, was harshly critical of anarchism, excoriating it, as a form of *décadence*, intent only upon destruction, and thus like his diagnosis of Christianity, still too infected with *ressentiment*, the spirit of revenge (Nietzsche 1954, 647). Post-anarchism has been described as “a left that thrives without authority and repression and rids itself of both inward- and outward-directed resentment” (Evren, 2011, 4). It would seem then that post-anarchism would be an anarchism that abandons the militancy of those in the early days who took up Bakunin’s call for violent resistance, and even the black bloc anarchists in Seattle who took to property violence. It was their actions that led to the “Battle of Seattle” with police flooding the streets with tear gas and firing concussion grenades that shook the skyscrapers, reverberating loudly through the downtown corridor. And yet the editor of the volume on post-anarchism seems to blame the media more than the militant anarchists: “Anarchism appeared to be taking back its name as a political philosophy and movement from the connotations and metaphors of chaos and violence. The mainstream media strategy of focusing exclusively on the black bloc tactic, unfortunately, only reproduced these connotations” (Evren 2011, 1).

The post-anarchists contend that anarchism is the only legitimate political position that follows from the post-structuralist critique of truth. As Koch explains, if there are only contingent truths, truths that are produced rather than discovered, then the coercive power of the state cannot be justified: “If the concepts under which action is coordinated are fictions, then the legitimacy of those actions is open to question” (Koch 2011, 32). The contingent and relative character of knowledge requires a decentering of politics. “Anarchism is the only justifiable political stance because it defends the pluralism that results from individuated meanings in discourse” (Koch 2011, 38). Todd May finds post-structuralism to be more consistently anarchist than traditional anarchism: “What both traditional anarchism and contemporary post-structuralism seek is a society—or better, a set of intersecting societies—in which people are not told who they are, what they want, and how they shall live, but who will be able to determine these things for themselves” (May 2011, 44).

This is the utopian dream of anarchism, and it is a nice dream; but the global crises brought on by the pandemic and climate change have made the lingering questions concerning the anarchist attack against the state more obvious and troubling. In an interview in September



2020, as the pandemic was ravaging populations across the globe, Newman expresses more concern about the dangers of government control than the need for government to take action to try and stop the spread of the virus. Of course, he is right to call attention to the dangers posed by the justification of the state and the use of force in the name of securitization, especially when the primary aim of securitization is the protection of wealth and the economic system that is designed to produce that wealth. But the pandemic should make it obvious that there is still the justification of the state to protect the common good of the people. One thing seems clear now in September 2021, speaking only of my own country, it hardly seems like the American people are ready for anarchism, of being capable of the responsibility that comes with determining for themselves how they shall live in times such as these when the lives of so many are endangered by the refusal of a significant percentage of the population to choose to get vaccinated and to wear masks and observe other CDC guidelines. In these conditions government mandates requiring people to wear masks in public, to be vaccinated in order to be employed in certain jobs, or to enter certain public spaces, seem not only reasonable but necessary.

The pandemic has exposed a key weakness in political anarchism. There is a point, and there has always been this point, when the anarchist emphasis on liberty and rejection of government seems too close to the reactionary libertarian emphasis on personal freedom and the conservative distrust in government that led to having the worst possible president in charge when the pandemic struck. The current president demonstrated what good government can do with the vaccine rollout in the early weeks of the administration. It seemed that we were almost on the other side of the pandemic until the Delta variant spread like wildfire through the unvaccinated population largely as a result of those who took mask wearing and vaccine mandates as an affront to their precious freedom and even a violation of their rights.

It seems the pandemic may also have exposed a flaw in the post-anarchist argument for anarchism. It just doesn't follow that the post-structuralist critique of truth undermines all justifications for government leaving anarchism as the only justifiable political stance. To draw this conclusion assumes the epistemological framework that was the target of Nietzsche's critique of truth, that the only way to evaluate competing perspectives is to compare them with a truth that is not a perspective, the "naked truth" of the way things are in themselves apart from interpretation. Koch argues that if "knowledge, as the construction of truth, cannot be externally validated, and epistemological and ontological plurality is the background for political reality, then anarchism becomes the only defensible normative position" (Koch 2011, 36). Here he is assuming the need for external validation, a truth that is not a perspective. Even if the world that concerns us is a fiction, there may still be degrees of apparentness, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance, as Nietzsche put it borrowing the language of painters. Truth is to be

thought in shades of grey rather than the opposition of black and white. Even if there are only contingent truths, there may still be contingent justifications for government.

The problem of climate change also makes it plain that we would be even worse off than we already are without government. The previous administration made that abundantly clear. The main reason that conservatives have so obstinately stuck to the notion that climate change is a hoax is that acknowledging the scientific consensus that climate change is happening and is indeed the result of the burning of fossil fuels challenges their whole agenda of undermining government in order to allow capitalism free reign to maximize wealth. One of the important justifications for progressive government has been, of course, the protection of the people, and the environment, from the oppression of corporate power. Clearly, if there were no government, and capitalism were to be completely unfettered, any chance we have of adequately addressing climate change would be lost.

The post-anarchists seem to understand this, that doing away with the state still leaves oppressive power in place. Newman calls attention to Foucault's warning that "the revolutionary seizure or even destruction of the state does not solve the problem of power" (Newman 2010, 169). The politics of post-anarchism, Newman suggests, involves resisting global capitalism outside the state rather than seizing state power or destroying the state. Instead of "laying the ground for a revolutionary event or a single, unified moment of global emancipation," Newman characterizes radical politics today as "a series of struggles, movements and communities whose existence is often fragile, whose practices are experimental, tentative and localised and whose continuity is by no means guaranteed" but which, nevertheless, are "moments of political rupture with the global order of power" (Newman 2010, 170). This radical politics involves not political parties but rather a movement "aimed at building alliances between activist groups around the world, rather than seizing state power" (Newman 2010, 175). He sees such a movement in "what has been broadly termed the Global Justice Movement, a movement that, although often fragmented, has managed at various points to mobilise masses of people around the world in opposition to capitalist globalization, and to articulate a certain common ground between different activist groups, interests, and struggles" (Newman 2010, 175). This movement, Newman contends, has "displayed a new form of radical politics, one that is closer to anarchism than Marxism" (Newman 2010, 175).

In the last chapter of his book, Newman suggests that this post-anarchist politics is really a radicalization of democracy. These diverse movements of resistance to global capitalism, he argues, "reject democracy in its current form; yet, they retain the horizon of democracy, while seeking to democratize it" (Newman 2010, 178). The key aspect of an anarchist approach to democracy, he contends, is the insistence that "democratic mechanisms promoted both equality and liberty in equal measure" (Newman 2010, 179). Here Newman suggests there is a resonance

between this anarchist radicalization of democracy and Derrida's idea of "democracy to come." Since the promise of democracy always exceeds its existing forms, with existing democracies never democratic enough, democracy is always 'to come,' pointing beyond to a future not yet realized. This does not mean we should give up on democracy, Newman insists, but rather that "we should never be satisfied with existing forms taken by democracy and should always be working towards a greater democratization in the here and now; towards an ongoing articulation of democracy's im/possible promise of perfect liberty with perfect equality" (Newman 2010, 180). Despite this idea of "democracy to come," Newman concludes at the end, once again citing Derrida in support, with a note of dissatisfaction with the term "democracy." He argues that "the new forms of autonomous politics that are currently emerging demand use of another term—*anarchism*" (Newman 2010, 181).

I can appreciate these doubts about democracy. It has always been a dangerous experiment in government, hoping that the prevailing winds of public opinion might stay fair, keeping the ship of state on course toward justice. The American experiment in democracy may yet result in a global catastrophe. The problem of climate change makes this clear. Every year the consequences of climate change are more and more severe. One might think we should be getting used to it by now, but the floods and fires around the world this summer have been particularly shocking, as has the recent hurricane that left a wake of devastation from Louisiana to New York. And yet, even though the evidence is unequivocal that the severity of these "natural" disasters is the result of anthropogenic climate change, there is a significant percentage of the American people that still believe that climate change is a hoax. They long for nothing more fervently than returning the climate-change denier to power. Meanwhile, the current president has set out an ambitious agenda in responding to climate change; and yet, there is not even a hint of a suggestion that the problem might be global capitalism. It is still impossible to raise doubts about capitalism in American democracy. The overwhelming majority of Americans unquestioningly equate democracy with capitalism even though the problem of climate change makes it more and more obvious that an economy designed primarily to exploit the earth in order to maximize wealth is going to eventually render the earth uninhabitable.

Thus, even though I am suspicious of the post-anarchist epistemological argument for anarchism, and think there can be contingent justifications for the state, that government "of the people, by the people, for the people" can be justified, I fully agree with the anarchist critique of our current democracy. As long as government serves primarily the interests of the wealthy, and protects an economic system designed to produce wealth, it is hard to see how we will ever be able to adequately address climate change and have a truly sustainable civilization, and a government that is really for the people. That is why I was in Seattle and decided to participate in civil disobedience that day. I did not really think of myself as an anarchist in doing so; however,

and I suspect that probably neither did most of those who participated in that action. Like Thoreau, I didn't want to destroy the state, but improve it. Thoreau conceived of civil disobedience as the highest form of patriotism, as a way in which those who serve the state with their conscience, can try to keep the state from falling into injustice. In his *Letter from a Birmingham Jail*, King suggests that those who engage in civil disobedience in the civil rights movement are latter day Socratic gadflies. The aim of civil disobedience is not to overthrow or destroy the state but to awaken the people to injustice. This is also why non-violence is such an essential key to civil disobedience as both Thoreau and King emphasized, and why the acts of property violence undertaken by the black bloc anarchists in Seattle only undermined the movement.

I agree with Newman that we should never be satisfied with existing forms of democracy and should always be working toward greater democratization in the here and now, striving always for a "democracy to come." However, I wonder if there is something missing in the anarchist formula of equal liberty and equality, something articulated in a text by Derrida that Newman doesn't address, his *Politiques de l'amitié, The Politics of Friendship*. The text is a long reflection on the revolutionary slogan "*liberté, égalité, fraternité*" that is still the slogan of the French Republic. Of course, Derrida takes up the issue why women were left out of this, thus emphasizing *amitié* rather than *fraternité*; but the primary focus of Derrida's reflection takes up how, beginning with Aristotle, the problem of democracy is bound up with the problem of friendship. Democracy is always "to come," Derrida emphasizes, because friendship is always "to come." Here Derrida turns to Nietzsche's discourse on friendship. He calls attention to the aphorism in *The Joyous Science* in which Nietzsche points out that what most people call "love" is really "avarice," only another lust for a new possession. Perhaps a higher love may one day come, Nietzsche suggests, a love whose "proper name is *friendship*" (Nietzsche 2018, 48). Then Derrida turns to Zarathustra's speech "On the Friend" in which Zarathustra explains why women are not yet capable of friendship, but then ends by asking: "But tell me, you men, who among you is capable of friendship?" (Nietzsche 2005, 50). This friendship would be a love that is a *gift* rather than an investment. As Derrida explicates Zarathustra's discourse: "The gift is that which gives friendship; it is needed for there to be friendship, beyond all comradeship" (Derrida 1997, 284). The difficulty, almost impossibility of friendship, is perhaps illustrated most dramatically in the story of how Robespierre, the one who coined the slogan "*liberté, égalité, fraternité*" ends up sending his own lifelong best friend to the guillotine. Who among us today is capable of the gift of friendship? This is why the main theme of Zarathustra's teaching involves the constant transformation or overcoming of human beings. Democracy is yet to come because friendship is still to come. Nevertheless, it is clear that liberty without friendship is just plain selfishness, as so well illustrated by those who refuse to wear masks or object to vaccine mandates as an

infringement upon their freedom. While equality is necessary for friendship, it is not clear that the anarchist emphasis on liberty and equality includes friendship. The problem of anarchism is the same problem of democracy—this friendship to come that involves this overcoming of humankind, the development, one might say, of higher states of consciousness. Hakim Bey perhaps sums up the problem with anarchism when he writes: “Without ‘higher states of consciousness,’ anarchism ends & dries itself up into a form of misery, a whining complaint” (Bey 2011, 70).

In Seattle late in the afternoon I was walking down the street toward one of the main scenes of the “Battle of Seattle.” There was a very large gathering of people forming a circle blocking the entire downtown intersection. As I approached from a couple of blocks away, I could hear a young woman in the center of the circle leading everyone in song. I only



remember the repeating refrain, amidst the cacophony of concussion grenades and rubber-bullet machine gunfire, everyone was singing about flooding the streets with justice. It was beautiful and almost brought tears to my eyes, which were soon to come anyway when more tear gas canisters exploded within the circle just in front of me. I backed up out of the cloud of gas and flushed my eyes with water. When I finally could see again, I opened my eyes upon the most surreal scene of the day. I had come to the building where the WTO was holding their banquet for the delegates. The buffet tables were lined up behind plate glass windows along the sidewalk. Some civil discussion seemed to be going on near the entrance to the building with protestors engaged in a discussion with WTO delegates. I remember one of the protestors was recording the whole thing on video. Looking through the windows I noticed there were these placards nicely laid out next to the food on the buffet table. I remember shaking my head in disbelief at the absurdity of it all, noticing that the placards read “Welcome to a Taste of America” just as another tear gas cannister exploded in the intersection, scattering everyone and leaving the WTO delegates gasping and rubbing their eyes as they stumbled into their taste of America.

I was thinking about the events of that day in Seattle when I went up in the summer of 2019 to the scene of the stand by the “protectors” (*kia‘i*) of Maunakea where a few thousand Hawaiians and supporters blocked the access road leading to the summit in order to prevent the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully discuss the merits of the case against the telescope, but it is clear that the *Ku Kia‘i Mauna* movement

shares many concerns with the broader Global Justice Movement. Writing prior to the recent events at Standing Rock and here on Maunakea, Hakim Bey notes that the “anarchist ‘movement’ today contains virtually no Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans or children . . . even tho in theory such genuinely oppressed groups stand to gain the most from an anti-authoritarian revolt” (Bey 2011, 69). It is not clear that most of those in the *Ku Kia ‘i Mauna* movement would identify as anarchists. When I ran into Jon Osorio, whom most of you remember from our 2016 conference when he gave a presentation to us in the session up on Maunakea, he scoffed when I mentioned our upcoming conference on anarchism. “This isn’t anarchism” he sharply responded. The Hawaiian sovereignty movement is not a rejection of the notion of sovereignty, they just want their own sovereignty.

Still, the movement did perhaps display some of the features of the global anarchist movement in being organized without authoritarian, hierarchical, and centralized command. Although there was leadership in the group of revered elders or *kupuna*, from what I understand the decision making within the *kupuna* tent was radically democratic. Most importantly, however, the *Ku Kia ‘i Mauna* movement shares with the global anarchist movement the opposition to the oppression of capitalism. It was, after all, American businessmen who overthrew the Queen, ending the sovereignty of the Hawaiian nation. The opposition to the telescopes is not really a problem with science, but rather with a political and economic system that has wrested from their hands control of their sacred lands. While I can think of even worse uses of the summit of Mauna Kea than building telescopes, it is still using the land as a mere resource, and perhaps we have a lot to learn from the Hawaiian notion of *Mālama honua* in learning how to take care of the earth. It would be a real tragedy, if the telescope enabled the fulfillment of the dream of astronomy to find our place in the universe just as we were about to go extinct because we never found our place on earth.

What was most impressive about the *Ku Kia ‘i Mauna* movement was how they were able to remain united in the commitment to non-violent civil disobedience more successfully than what I witnessed in Seattle. This had a lot to do with the *Kapu Aloha* protocols that the movement strictly adhered to. Although the commitment to non-violence certainly resonates with what Thoreau and King said, Hawaiians emphasize that it comes out of their cultural tradition as well. I was also very impressed with the protocol ceremonies that took place several times a day with chanting and hula. It seemed to keep everyone together, focused on the mission of the movement, making it impervious to black bloc anarchists or agent provocateurs.



The last point I want to make is the thing that brought me to tears on the mauna, very different from the tears brought on by tear gas in Seattle. I was standing to the side of the road, a few feet out in front of the kupuna tent, which had been erected right across the access road to the summit. In front of the kupuna tent a couple of musicians started

to play. A woman, Starr Kalahiki is her name, started to sing the old traditional anthem of the Hawaiian nation. One by one, a number of women got up from the crowd, dressed in their regular clothes rather than performance attire, and began to move in graceful hula in front of the kupuna tent. It was a beautiful, powerful moment. “Wow,” I thought, tears streaming down my face, “this is how Hawaiians do civil disobedience—dropping a *kanikapila* right on the access road.” Maybe this is the most important feature of a post-anarchism: an anarchism without resentment, non-violent civil disobedience, waking up the people with art and not bombs.

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